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The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor 
LESLIE C. GRIFFIN* 
The Supreme Court has lost sight of individual religious freedom. In 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, the Court for the 
first time recognized the ministerial exception, a court-created doctrine that holds 
that the First Amendment requires the dismissal of many employment 
discrimination cases against religious employers. The Court ruled unanimously 
that Cheryl Perich, an elementary school teacher who was fired after she tried to 
return to school from disability leave, could not pursue an antidiscrimination 
lawsuit against her employer. 
This Article criticizes Hosanna-Tabor as a profound misinterpretation of the 
First Amendment. The Court mistakenly protected religious institutions’ religious 
freedom at the expense of their religious employees. Religious employees have been 
subjected to disabilities discrimination, sexual harassment, unequal pay, hostile 
work environments, age discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, gender 
discrimination, race discrimination, assault, retaliation, national origin 
discrimination, tortious interference with contract, blacklisting, intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. Instead of having 
a day in court to win or lose their cases, they have been barred from litigation by 
the ministerial exception, a rule that always grants victory to the employer. 
This Article explains the flaws in Hosanna-Tabor’s reasoning and questions its 
presupposition that religious institutions are constitutionally entitled to disobey the 
law. It defends a neutral interpretation of the First Amendment over the Court’s 
favoritism toward religion and explains how the antidiscrimination laws can and 
should be applied to religious organizations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has lost sight of individual religious freedom. Consider the 
case of Cheryl Perich, an elementary school teacher at Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School, a K–8 school in Redford, Michigan. The school’s 
personnel manuals stated that she, like any other schoolteacher, was protected by 
employment discrimination laws.1 As the 2004–2005 school year approached, 
Perich suddenly and unexpectedly became ill. When she tried to return to class 
from disability leave, the school suggested that she voluntarily resign. Perich 
refused and was fired after she threatened to talk to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) about a disabilities discrimination lawsuit. She 
then sued Hosanna-Tabor under the antiretaliation provisions of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA).2 
The Supreme Court unanimously denied Perich her day in court. In Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,3 the Court ruled that the 
First Amendment requires a “ministerial exception” to the employment laws. The 
ministerial exception is a court-created doctrine holding that the First Amendment 
requires the dismissal of many employment discrimination cases against religious 
employers, even when the antidiscrimination statutes authorize litigation.4 
The Fifth Circuit created the ministerial exception in 1972 when it dismissed 
Mrs. Billie McClure’s equal pay lawsuit against the Salvation Army.5 After that, 
federal and state courts repeatedly expanded the exception to reject lawsuits by 
elementary and secondary school teachers, school principals, university professors, 
music teachers, choir directors, organists, administrators, administrative secretaries, 
communications managers, and public relations personnel alleging violations of the 
ADA, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Title VII, the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
the Family & Medical Leave Act, workers’ compensation laws, and numerous state 
tort and contract laws.6 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court for the first time 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 782 
(6th Cir. 2010). 
 2. Id. at 775. 
 3. 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012). 
 4. Id. 
 5. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 6. See, e.g., Skrzypcazk v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 
2010) (director of the Department of Religious Formation could not bring an Equal Pay Act 
claim); Alcazar v. Corp. of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(seminarian could not bring state minimum wage claim); McCants v. Alabama-W. Florida 
Conf. of United Methodist Church, 372 F. App’x 39 (11th Cir. 2010) (African American 
pastor could not bring § 1981 race and retaliation claim); Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 
F. App’x 654 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1714 (2010) (rabbi’s breach of contract 
claim dismissed); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008) (priest could not bring 
Title VII racial discrimination claim); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 
2006) (college chaplain could not bring Title VII sex discrimination claim); Tomic v. 
Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006) (music director could not bring 
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recognized the ministerial exception as a requirement of the religion clauses of the 
First Amendment. 
This Article criticizes that ruling as a profound misinterpretation of the First 
Amendment. The Court mistakenly protected religious institutions’ religious 
freedom at the expense of their religious employees. Over the forty years since 
McClure v. Salvation Army,7 religious employees have been subjected to disability 
discrimination, sexual harassment, unequal pay, hostile work environments, age 
discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, gender discrimination, race 
discrimination, assault, retaliation, national origin discrimination, tortious 
interference with contract, blacklisting, intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, breach of contract, and more.8 Instead of having a day in court 
to win or lose their cases, they have been barred from litigation by the ministerial 
exception, a rule that always grants victory to the employer. 
Professor Philip Kurland argued that “[l]imited powers of government were not 
instituted to expand the realm of power of religious organizations, but rather in 
favor of freedom of action and thought by the people.”9 In the Supreme Court, 
however, the people’s concerns were abandoned and the power of religious 
institutions aggrandized. Chief Justice Roberts blithely wrote that the ministerial 
exception “has not given rise to the dire consequences predicted by the EEOC and 
Perich” in the forty years since it came into being.10 Yet the consequences of the 
exception have been dire for every individual employee whose rights were 
trampled by a religious employer and who then lost his day in court—and job. The 
Court has lost sight of individual religious freedom. 
In ruling for Hosanna-Tabor, the Court explicitly rejected the EEOC’s argument 
that Perich’s case should be handled by the freedom of association protected by the 
First Amendment. The advantage of relying on association instead of religion is 
that “the right to freedom of association is a right enjoyed by religious and secular 
groups alike.”11 The Court strongly rejected the EEOC’s position as “untenable” 
because the First Amendment “gives special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations.”12 What the Court sees as “special solicitude,” however, I see as 
                                                                                                                 
ADEA claim); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Hispanic communications manager could not bring Title VII national origin claim); 
Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999) (choirmaster’s ADA claim dismissed); 
Combs v. Cent. Texas Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 
1999) (former clergy member could not bring pregnancy discrimination claim); Ross v. 
Metro. Church of God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (director of Worship Arts 
(music director) barred from bringing § 1981 claim); Fassl v. Our Lady of Perpetual Help 
Roman Catholic Church, No. 05-CV-0404, 2005 WL 2455253 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2005) 
(director of music precluded from bringing FMLA suit); Malichi v. Archdiocese of Miami, 
945 So. 2d 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (priest could not bring state workers’ 
compensation claim). 
 7. McClure, 460 F.2d at 553. 
 8. For an example of cases, see supra note 6. 
 9. Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1, 4 (1961). 
 10. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
 11. Id. at 706. 
 12. Id. 
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lawlessness; the Court held that religious organizations enjoy special freedom to 
disobey the law. 
When Hosanna-Tabor and the earlier ministerial exception cases are reviewed 
in detail, it becomes apparent that the numerous justifications for the exception are 
all a restatement of one foundational and fundamentally mistaken argument: that 
religious groups are entitled to disobey the law. 
It is unfortunate that the Court gave its imprimatur to a lawless interpretation of 
the religion clauses. In this Article, I identify the numerous flaws in the Court’s 
reasoning in Hosanna-Tabor and argue that the Court was mistaken to recognize a 
special preferential rule for religious organizations. 
In Part I, for background I provide the details of Cheryl Perich’s retaliation 
lawsuit against Hosanna-Tabor and explain the reasoning of the Court’s ruling 
against her. Part II challenges the Court’s argument that the history of the First 
Amendment requires that ministers not enjoy the protection of the employment 
laws. The Court’s historical argument about English governments’ appointment of 
ministers mistakenly ignores the actual context of contemporary ministers and 
overlooks a different constitutional history—namely of individual, not institutional, 
religious freedom. Part III rebuts the Court’s argument that the leading Free 
Exercise Clause precedent, Employment Division v. Smith,13 which held specifically 
that Native Americans must obey the drug laws and generally that religious citizens 
must follow “neutral laws of general applicability,” did not require a ruling for 
Perich. It is unacceptable that religious individuals must obey the law but religious 
institutions need not. Part IV addresses the argument of numerous ministerial 
employees, including Perich, that religion was a pretext rather than the real reason 
for their firing, and criticizes the Court’s astonishing response that firing for 
nonreligious as well as religious reasons is protected by the First Amendment.14 
Part V examines the vexing question of who qualifies as a minister pre- and post-
Hosanna-Tabor. Although the Court’s definition of minister appears to leave open 
some situations in which religious employees may sue their employers, lower court 
precedents suggest that most employees will continue to lose their day in court. The 
Conclusion ends with a defense of a neutral interpretation of the First Amendment 
over the Court’s favoritism toward religion. 
I begin with the facts and reasoning of Hosanna-Tabor. 
I. CHERYL PERICH V. HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH AND 
SCHOOL 
In 1999, Cheryl Perich became a kindergarten teacher at Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, a K–8 school in Redford, Michigan. Four 
years later Perich switched to teaching fourth grade students at Hosanna-Tabor. Her 
classes included Math, Language Arts, Social Studies, Science, Gym, Art, Music, 
Computer, and, occasionally, Religion. During her time there she switched from lay 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 14. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709 (stating that the purpose of the ministerial 
exception is “not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is made for 
a religious reason”). 
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teacher status to called teacher status. As the 2004–2005 school year approached, 
Perich was preparing to teach third and fourth grade. Suddenly and unexpectedly, 
in June 2004 she was hospitalized after becoming ill at a school golf event. Because 
her health had not improved by the time the 2004 school year started, Hosanna-
Tabor granted her a disability leave of absence. After Perich took the disability 
leave, the principal assured her that “‘she would still have a job with [us]’ when she 
regained her health.”15 
Fortunately, Perich’s doctor was able to diagnose her illness as narcolepsy and 
to prescribe appropriate medication to ameliorate her symptoms. By February 
2005, the doctor assured Perich that she was “fully functional” and able to perform 
her job.16 Perich immediately presented her doctor’s certification to school 
officials. She was eager to return to her classroom and to follow the proper 
requirements to keep her job. Hosanna-Tabor’s employment handbook provided 
that “failure to return to work on the first day following the expiration of an 
approved medical leave may be considered a voluntary termination.”17 Moreover, 
Perich was no longer eligible for disability insurance once she had the release letter 
from her doctor. Accordingly, Perich informed the school of her doctor’s findings 
and prepared to return to work. 
School officials, however, questioned her doctor’s diagnosis without providing 
any medical support for their skepticism about her return to work. They urged 
Perich to resign voluntarily from her position. Perich questioned their decision and 
mentioned that she would talk to an attorney about a disabilities discrimination 
lawsuit. The court found that the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod personnel 
manual and the Governing Manual for Lutheran Schools in effect at Hosanna-
Tabor “clearly contemplate that teachers are protected by employment 
discrimination and contract laws.”18 Nevertheless, school officials fired Perich for 
threatening to sue.19 
Jobless despite her employment contract and her employer’s promise to keep a 
position open for her after her disability leave, Perich, joined by the EEOC, filed a 
disabilities discrimination and retaliation lawsuit against Hosanna-Tabor under the 
ADA. Following Sixth Circuit precedent, the district court and the Sixth Circuit 
applied a “primary duties” test to determine whether Perich’s ADA and retaliation 
lawsuit against Hosanna-Tabor would be dismissed under the ministerial 
exception.20 If Perich’s primary duties were religious, the case would be dismissed. 
If Perich’s primary duties were secular, she would have her day in court. The 
district court concluded that the ministerial exception applied and dismissed the 
lawsuit. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Perich’s primary duties were 
secular. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 772–73 (6th Cir. 
2010). 
 16. Id. at 773. 
 17. Id. at 774. 
 18. Id. at 782. 
 19. Id. at 774–75. 
 20. See id. at 771, 778; EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 
582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
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In the district court, Hosanna-Tabor did not introduce any evidence about 
Perich’s primary, secular, or religious duties and did not challenge Perich’s 
description of her duties as an elementary school teacher.21 According to the Sixth 
Circuit’s opinion, on appeal Hosanna-Tabor “attempted to reframe the underlying 
dispute from the question of whether Hosanna-Tabor fired Perich in violation of the 
ADA to the question of whether Perich violated church doctrine by not engaging in 
internal dispute resolution.”22 In the Supreme Court, Hosanna-Tabor argued that the 
“ministerial exception is a categorical rule; if a claim falls within it, the claim must 
be dismissed.”23 
If Perich were allowed to litigate her case, she would argue that the church 
violated the antiretaliation provision of the ADA, which states: “No person shall 
discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or 
practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this chapter.”24 The ADA language is similar to the antiretaliation 
language of other civil rights legislation, including Title VII,25 in allowing lawsuits 
for both opposition and participation, that is, for employees who oppose unlawful 
employer conduct or participate in an investigation, complaint, or other legal 
proceeding against the employer. Perich’s lawsuit was the latter type because she 
alleged she was fired in response to filing a complaint with the EEOC and 
threatening to sue Hosanna-Tabor.26 
In order to establish a prima facie antiretaliation case, Perich must demonstrate 
that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected conduct, (2) she suffered a materially 
adverse employment action, and (3) there was a “causal connection between the 
statutorily protected conduct and the adverse action.”27 Victory in a participation 
case like Perich’s would be near absolute”28 because (1) filing with the EEOC is 
protected conduct and (2) being fired easily qualifies as a materially adverse 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. See Brief of Cheryl Perich as Appellant at 22, EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010) (Nos. 09-1134, 09-1135) 2009 WL 
8384308. 
 22. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 781 
(2012). 
 23. Brief for the Petitioner at 24, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694 (No. 10-553). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 25. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for 
an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or 
other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against 
any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or 
applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, 
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter.”). 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); Brief of Cheryl Perich as Appellant at 18–19, Hosanna-
Tabor, 597 F.3d 769 (Nos. 09-1134, 09-1135). 
 27. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & LAUREN M. WALTER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAW AND PRACTICE 362 (4th ed. 2009). 
 28. Id. at 366. 
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employment action.29 Under the third element, moreover, Perich has direct 
evidence of Hosanna-Tabor’s retaliatory intent: Hosanna-Tabor sent Perich a letter 
stating it was firing her because she had threatened to sue.30 
At trial, Hosanna-Tabor would be free to counter Perich’s presentation with its 
own evidence that it would have fired her even if she had not threatened a lawsuit. 
The letter to Perich would make that argument difficult. Those bad facts and 
Perich’s direct evidence of retaliation may explain why late in the case the school 
“attempted to reframe the underlying dispute from the question of whether 
Hosanna-Tabor fired Perich in violation of the ADA to the question of whether 
Perich violated church doctrine by not engaging in internal dispute resolution.”31 In 
other words, school officials may have transformed a legal question into a religious 
dispute by challenging Perich’s spirituality long after they had retaliated against 
her, by arguing that a spiritual person does not sue her employer. 
It is noteworthy that Hosanna-Tabor did not offer a nonretaliatory defense to its 
firing of Cheryl Perich, but instead argued that it was justified in retaliating against 
Perich because she was spiritually unfit.32 In other words, it argued that the First 
Amendment grants it religious freedom to retaliate against employees who assert 
their right to sue. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s ruling that Perich’s primary 
duties were secular and ruled that she was a minister for purposes of the ministerial 
exception.33 Warning that the question of who qualifies as a minister “is not one 
that can be resolved by a stopwatch,”34 the Court concluded that the Sixth Circuit 
had ignored Perich’s title, and had placed too much emphasis on Perich’s secular 
duties and the similarities of those duties to the lay teachers’ jobs. The Court 
emphasized Hosanna-Tabor’s recognition of two types of teachers (“called” and 
“lay”) and observed that Perich became a “called” teacher after she engaged in a 
course of theological study in a Lutheran colloquy, thereby becoming a 
commissioned minister.35 
Refusing to adopt a “rigid formula” for a minister, the Court suggested that 
individuals who convey a church’s message and carry out its mission are ministers 
for First Amendment purposes.36 In Perich’s case, “the formal title given Perich by 
the Church, the substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (Title VII 
prohibits employer actions that would likely “‘deter victims of discrimination from 
complaining to the EEOC’”). 
 30. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 774 
(6th Cir. 2006). 
 31. Id. at 781. 
 32. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-533) (arguing Perich was fired “because her 
insubordination and threats of litigation violated Church teaching”). 
 33. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708, 710. 
 34. Id. at 709. 
 35. Id. at 699–700. 
 36. Id. at 707–08. 
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important religious functions she performed for the Church”37 qualified her for the 
exemption. Therefore her antiretaliation lawsuit was dismissed. 
In its legal reasoning, the Court insisted that the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses require a ministerial exception. The Court based that 
conclusion on the history of the First Amendment and a few of the Court’s older 
church property cases. The substantive arguments are reviewed in the following 
Parts. In fact, the Court’s argument was not very complex. It seemed to apply a 
simple syllogism: (1) churches enjoy absolute freedom to pick their ministers; (2) 
Perich was a minister; and therefore (3) the employment laws could not be 
enforced. Part II rejects the over-simplified history that undergirds the Court’s 
opinion. 
II. A MISTAKEN READING OF HISTORY AND MINISTERS 
The Court’s historical argument about the First Amendment begins with the 
Magna Carta in 1215 and paints a sorry story of church ministers being forcibly 
appointed by the English Crown. Puritans and Quakers apparently fled Europe in 
order to “elect their own ministers.”38 According to the Court, the Religion Clauses 
allowed “no role [for the government] in filling ecclesiastical offices.” Secretary of 
State James Madison warned “against a political interference with religious 
affairs.”39 Throughout the opinion, government appointment of ministers is 
identified as the key evil motivating the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 
Thus the Court’s account of First Amendment history appears to be a “curious 
mash-up of religious and political history” that stops in 1791.40 
Other available accounts of that history were neglected. For example, after the 
sixteenth century, Britain abolished the ecclesiastical courts’ jurisdiction over the 
clergy’s criminal conduct and increasingly subjected clergy to the rule of law.41 
The United States never had a system of ecclesiastical courts, but instead ab initio 
subjected clergy to court proceedings.42 Thus an alternative lesson of English and 
American history is that religious institutions and clergy should be subject to the 
secular courts. 
On another account of the Constitution, the Framers, who knew and understood 
the history of religious power in Europe from the Inquisition to the Wars of 
Religion, developed a Constitution acknowledging “that every individual and every 
institution holding power was likely to abuse that power and therefore must be 
checked.”43 Like all other powerful institutions, religions had to be subject to the 
rule of law. The religion clauses did just that. The same James Madison quoted on 
behalf of the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor feared the power of both state 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. Id. at 708. 
 38. Id. at 702. 
 39. Id. at 703. 
 40. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Church, THE IMMANENT FRAME (Jan. 31, 2012, 
4:25 PM), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/01/31/the-church/. 
 41. Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public 
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1128–29. 
 42. Id. at 1132. 
 43. Id. at 1133. 
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and church and warned against “the potential abuse of ecclesiastical corporate 
power.”44 Even Protestant clergy of the revolutionary era supported the First 
Amendment because they understood that “[p]ower, civil and ecclesiastical, has to 
be deflated, diffused, and properly related in order to keep it from becoming 
absolute, arbitrary, and abused.”45 Thus an alternative lesson in American history is 
that the power of religious institutions needs to be limited as much as any other 
institution’s power. 
Another interpretation of the First Amendment holds that the Bill of Rights 
protects individual freedom against the power of institutions. As the late 
constitutional scholar Philip Kurland concluded, “[l]imited powers of government 
were not instituted to expand the realm of power of religious organizations, but 
rather in favor of freedom of action and thought by the people.”46 Interpreting the 
Free Exercise Clause to protect religious institutions’ rights against their members 
ignores the experience of the earliest Americans, who broke away from traditional 
religious organizations and pursued individual liberty.47 “The American Revolution 
broke many of the intimate ties that had traditionally linked religion and 
government . . . and turned religion into a voluntary affair, a matter of individual 
free choice.”48 Americans of that era “believed that the individual, not the state or 
the church, should decide matters of faith.”49 Thus, yet another alternative lesson of 
English and American history is that courts should not select a legal rule that 
automatically favors powerful institutions over individuals as the ministerial 
exception does. 
According to the National Employment Lawyers Association, who filed a brief 
in the Supreme Court on behalf of Cheryl Perich, an early American tradition of 
allowing lawsuits by former and current ministers against their employers coexisted 
alongside the history of opposition to government appointment of ministers.50 
Some ministers successfully sued to recover their positions.51 Courts regularly 
enforced employment contracts involving clergy:52 
 Courts gave several reasons for enforcing contract claims by 
ministers. They explained, first, that ministers had the same right as 
anyone else to judicial enforcement of their legal rights. . . . A 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. FORREST CHURCH, SO HELP ME GOD: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE FIRST GREAT 
BATTLE OVER CHURCH AND STATE 355 (2007). 
 45. James H. Smylie, Protestant Clergy, the First Amendment and Beginnings of a 
Constitutional Debate, 1781–91, in THE RELIGION OF THE REPUBLIC 116, 153 (Elwyn A. 
Smith ed., 1971) (emphasis added). 
 46. Kurland, supra note 9, at 4. 
 47. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–
1815, at 609–13 (2009). 
 48. Id. at 576. 
 49. FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 
180 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 50. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Employment Lawyers Association in Support 
of Respondents at 3–4, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 
S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553). 
 51. Id. at 4–7. 
 52. Runkel v. Winemiller, 4 H. & McH. 429 (Md. 1799). 
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substantial portion of these [cases in which religious organizations 
sought redress from secular courts] involved a disputed dismissal, the 
religious organization seeking a court order to enjoin a previously 
appointed minister from continuing to hold services or engage in other 
functions. These lawsuits necessarily turned at least in part on the 
legality of the defendant’s termination, and a decision in favor of the 
minister-defendant overturned the purported dismissal and confirmed 
his right to remain in the pulpit.53 
Thus an alternative lesson of American history is that ministers have not 
traditionally fallen outside the protection of civil law in the manner that Hosanna-
Tabor suggests. 
The Court’s reasoning in Hosanna-Tabor demonstrates the dangers of historical 
analogy and originalism in resolving contemporary problems. As argued above, 
alternative histories that protect clergy rights were equally available for the Court’s 
selection. Moreover, the idea that government appointment of ministers in Europe 
should resolve the case of a disabled elementary schoolteacher in Michigan lacks 
common, moral, and legal sense. Many of the ministerial exception cases have 
involved women clergy in Christian denominations for whom women’s ordination 
was not even imaginable at the time of the nation’s founding. The founding 
Constitution lacked the Fourteenth Amendment’s commitment to racial, gender, 
and political equality. Today’s American employees, religious and nonreligious 
alike, came of age enjoying the protection of the civil rights legislation of the 
1960s, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, gender, 
and religion, thus banning sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and 
pregnancy discrimination from the workplace. The disability rights movement 
began in the 1970s and culminated in bipartisan passage of the ADA in 1990. In 
passing these antidiscrimination statutes, moreover, Congress repeatedly refused to 
exempt religious organizations from lawsuits for discrimination on the basis of 
race, national origin, gender, pregnancy, and disabilities. 
Thus, despite the fact that multiple plausible historical interpretations of the 
First Amendment’s religion clauses exist, the Court chose a truncated history of the 
Magna Carta that automatically dismisses antidiscrimination lawsuits. This is 
unacceptable. Using English history to overcome civil rights legislation approved 
by Congress defies the rule of law. 
Instead, the lesson of the modern history of sexual harassment, antiretaliation, 
disability, and minimum wage cases is that male and female seminarians and clergy 
may require legal protection from their church supervisors and colleagues. A 
Mexican seminarian who moved to Washington state and stereotypically performed 
maintenance work as part of his duties was denied the protection of sexual 
harassment, antiretaliation, and state minimum wage laws simply because he was a 
seminarian.54 Older pastors have been fired because of their age;55 black and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 53. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Employment Lawyers Association in Support 
of Respondents, supra note 50, at 7, 9–10 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 54. See Alcazar v. Corp. of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292–93 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 55. See, e.g., Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 
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Hispanic ministers because of their race and national origin.56 Women clergy have 
been denied the protection of equal pay and pregnancy discrimination laws.57 The 
only reason given is that the ministerial relationship enjoys a different legal 
status.58 
Reverend Pamela Combs, for example, was first ordained a Baptist minister and 
later became a Methodist minister working for the United Methodist Church. Soon 
after telling church officials she was pregnant, Combs asked why her salary was 
lower than comparable male ministers’ salaries and asked for a different housing 
allowance.59 After Combs gave birth, she “suffered serious post-partum 
complications, which required hospitalization, surgery, heavy medication, and 
extensive rest.”60 Only then did her male pastor question her “competence, 
performance, and honesty.”61 Despite the fact that the Methodist bishop had 
reappointed Combs to a ministerial role, her pastoral supervisor determined she 
was a lay employee and asked her to repay her maternity benefits.62 Reverend 
Combs’s pregnancy discrimination case was then dismissed under the ministerial 
exception, even though the United Methodist Church had returned her to lay status 
in order to end her insurance coverage. 
Mary Rosati was a novice with the Roman Catholic Contemplative Order of the 
Sisters of the Visitation of Toledo, Ohio. After fifteen months with the order, 
during which she had advanced from postulant stage to novice, Rosati developed 
kidney problems and breast cancer and underwent neurosurgery for a herniated 
disc.63 After Rosati’s doctor explained to the Mother Superior that Rosati would 
need a lumpectomy or mastectomy as well as further breast cancer treatment, 
Mother Superior said, “We will have to let her go. I don’t think we can take care of 
her.”64 The doctor was concerned about the Mother Superior’s remarks because he 
understood that Rosati would lose her health insurance if she left the order.65 Later, 
another sister told Rosati, “Maybe God is trying to tell you something. Perhaps you 
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 56. See, e.g., Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 
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 57. See, e.g., Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 
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 58. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
 59. See Combs, 173 F.3d at 343. 
 60. Id. at 344. 
 61. Id. 
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 63. See Rosati v. Toledo, Ohio Catholic Diocese, 233 F. Supp. 2d 917 (N.D. Ohio 
2002). 
 64. Id. at 918. 
 65. See id. 
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don’t have a vocation.”66 Rosati’s case was also dismissed under the ministerial 
exception.67 
The assumption in the Court’s historical argument about government 
appointment of ministers is that ministers should not enjoy the protection of the 
civil rights laws. Taking ministers outside the protection of the courts supposedly 
protects religious freedom. The ministerial exception instead stands for the 
proposition that religious institutions are not required to obey the law, even at the 
expense of the civil rights of their religious employees. This holding appears 
irreconcilable with the Court’s earlier rulings about the Free Exercise Clause, 
which I discuss in the next Part. Part III explains that the Court misinterpreted its 
own leading Free Exercise precedent in order to issue a ruling for Hosanna-Tabor. 
III. RECONCILING EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH 
The leading free exercise case is the Court’s 1990 decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith.68 In Smith, the Court held that two Native American drug 
counselors who used peyote in a religious ritual could be denied unemployment 
compensation benefits because the criminal laws prohibit drug use. The famous 
language from Smith is that all citizens are subject to “neutral laws of general 
applicability”69 because to permit exceptions from the criminal law “would be to 
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and 
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”70 Thus under Smith 
every religious citizen must follow the law if it is a neutral law of general 
applicability. 
Opponents of the ministerial exception, including this author, have argued that if 
religious individuals must obey neutral laws of general applicability, so too must 
religious institutions. Just as Alfred Smith had to obey neutral drug laws of general 
applicability, they have insisted, so too should Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School and other religious employers obey the 
antidiscrimination laws.71 Nonetheless, all the federal courts of appeals ruled that 
the ministerial exception is consistent with Smith.72 The Supreme Court confirmed 
the courts’ position in a short paragraph that distinguished Smith from the 
ministerial exception: 
 It is true that the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation, like Oregon’s 
prohibition on peyote use, is a valid and neutral law of general 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 922–23. 
 68. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 69. Id. at 901. 
 70. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878)). 
 71. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law & Religion Professors in Support of Respondents at 
17–20, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) 
(No. 10-553) 
 72. See Bryce v. Episcopal Church Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 656 (10th Cir. 
2002); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 
n.2 (2012) (identifying circuit holdings on Smith and the exception). 
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applicability. But a church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an 
individual’s ingestion of peyote. Smith involved government regulation 
of only outward physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns 
government interference with an internal church decision that affects 
the faith and mission of the church itself. The contention that Smith 
forecloses recognition of a ministerial exception rooted in the Religion 
Clauses has no merit.73 
This is a strange argument in the context of the ministerial exception. In terms of 
religious freedom, the ingestion of peyote is a profound religious ritual with a long 
American history predating the Constitution.74 In sharp contrast, the ministerial 
exception involves cases where employees allege disabilities discrimination, 
retaliation, pregnancy discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work environment, 
unequal pay, race discrimination, gender discrimination, and other civil rights 
violations.75 Women clergy, for example, sue for pregnancy discrimination, sexual 
harassment, hostile work environment, and unequal pay.76 Other ministers sue for 
disabilities discrimination.77 Many of these “ministers” have been schoolteachers or 
nonordained personnel who did not realize they were “ministers” until their 
lawsuits were dismissed.78 
The Court asserts that it rightly distinguishes between the “outward physical 
acts” of Smith and the “internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of 
the church itself” in Hosanna-Tabor.79 That distinction cannot hold water. What 
could “affect[] the faith and mission of the church itself” more than punishing 
individuals like Smith for participation in a religious ritual? And what “internal 
church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself” is involved in 
the firing of a disabled employee in a church that does not preach disabilities 
discrimination?80 
The distinction between “outward physical acts” and the “internal church 
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself” collapses when the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707 (citing Employment Div., Dept. of Human 
Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (distinguishing the government’s regulation 
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 75. For a list of pertinent cases, see supra note 6. 
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 78. See Pardue v. Ctr. City of Consortium Sch., 875 A.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Alicea-
Hernandez, 320 F.3d 698; Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 
No. 97-2648, 1998 WL 904528 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1998); Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. v. 
Miñagorri, 954 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & 
Indus. Review Comm’n, 2009 WI 88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868. 
 79. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 
(2012). 
 80. Id. 
994 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:981 
 
Court clarifies that Smith bars religious acts by individuals while Hosanna-Tabor 
governs cases that do not even involve a religious dispute between the parties. It 
seems odd that an individual’s religious ritual would not enjoy First Amendment 
protection while a nonreligious dispute among church members would. 
Nonetheless, in one of the most astonishing parts of the opinion, the Court held: 
The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to 
fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The 
exception instead ensures that the authority to select and control who 
will minister to the faithful—a matter “strictly ecclesiastical”—is the 
church’s alone.81 
Thus, the Court did not protect religious freedom by refusing to take sides in a 
religious dispute, as it had done in its past church property cases.82 Instead, it ruled 
that religious employers enjoy absolute First Amendment protection to dismiss 
their “ministers” even when no religious issue is involved. In other words, religious 
freedom trumps the antidiscrimination laws even when no religious dispute is at 
stake. According to the Supreme Court, religious freedom entitles institutions to 
disobey the law. 
To understand the confused rationale behind the Court’s ruling on the 
nonreligious or religious nature of the employment dispute, it is important to 
understand the ministerial exception case law that developed in the courts before 
Hosanna-Tabor. Although the Court referred to that body of case law,83 it did not 
spend sufficient time in assessing the nuances of the prior litigation. The following 
Part of this Article provides more evidence that the Court’s dismissal of 
nonreligious disputes on First Amendment grounds is based on its unseemly belief 
that religious organizations are free to disobey the law. Part IV explains that the 
ministerial exception is unnecessary because antidiscrimination law is capable of 
handling the problems that usually justify the ministerial exception. 
IV. FIRING EMPLOYEES FOR NONRELIGIOUS AND PRETEXTUAL REASONS 
In order to analyze the Court’s ruling in Perich’s case, it is important to 
understand the general structure of an employment discrimination lawsuit. Recall 
from Part I that in order to establish a prima facie antiretaliation case, Perich had to 
demonstrate that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected conduct, (2) she suffered a 
materially adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal connection 
between the statutorily protected conduct and the adverse action.84 
The elements of the prima facie case do not intrude upon the First Amendment. 
Allowing lawsuits against religious organizations does not guarantee success for 
employees. A minister who complains that a coworker is “making her miserable” 
without clarifying that she is complaining about sexual harassment has not engaged 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. Id. at 709 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 82. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
 83. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710. 
 84. SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 27. 
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in statutorily protected activity.85 A pastoral student who merely asserts, “I worry 
about retaliation for filing the EEOC complaint” has not stated a clear claim of 
retaliation.86 Reverend Gellington (who was asked to move 800 miles at reduced 
pay),87 Chaplain Schmoll (who lost fifty percent of her work hours),88 Chaplain 
Petruska (whose office was reorganized before she resigned under pressure),89 and 
Reverend Himaka (whose office lost its funding)90 would have to prove that the 
employment action taken against them was materially adverse.91 All plaintiffs have 
to prove a causal link between the statutorily protected conduct and the adverse 
employment action.92 Unlike Perich, many plaintiffs do not have direct evidence of 
a letter stating that threatening a lawsuit cost them their jobs and will have to rely 
upon circumstantial evidence to make their claim. 
Once the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the burden of production 
shifts to the defendant.93 Although the exact nature of that burden is described 
differently under various antidiscrimination statutes, the burden shift allows the 
defendant to rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie case. In a retaliation case, for example, 
the defendant could “put into evidence a nonretaliatory reason for its action” or 
evidence that it would have made the same decision anyway.94 The nonretaliatory 
reason may be religious or nonreligious. Once the defendant identifies this 
nonretaliatory reason for action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish 
that the defendant’s reason is a pretext for action. Under the classic McDonnell 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 793 F. Supp. 2d 381, 397, 408 
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996 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:981 
 
Douglas rule that governed many ministerial exception cases, once the defendant 
offers its nondiscriminatory rationale for action, the plaintiff must “be afforded a 
fair opportunity to show that [defendant’s] stated reason for [plaintiff’s] rejection 
was in fact pretext.”95 
Part A explains what happens in an employment lawsuit when employers offer 
either religious or nonreligious reasons to justify their employment action. Part B 
challenges the Court’s conclusion in Hosanna-Tabor that the pretextual analysis is 
always prohibited under the First Amendment. 
A. Religious and Nonreligious Reasons for Employment Actions 
Perhaps surprisingly, there are not many ministerial exception cases that take the 
form of Perich’s, where the defendant asserts that it has a religious reason to violate 
the law; namely that retaliation (as prohibited by law) is proper because Christian 
employees are not allowed to sue. Church defendants rarely state that they have a 
religious belief in racial or national-origin discrimination, gender discrimination, 
disabilities discrimination, or sexual harassment when those types of lawsuits are 
brought against them. The majority of gender discrimination cases, for example, 
are filed by either women clergy or women in nonclerical positions.96 Rockwell v. 
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston is the rare case in which a woman sued the 
Roman Catholic Church seeking ordination to their all-male priesthood.97 The 
women’s ordination case is usually viewed as offering the strongest argument on 
behalf of the ministerial exception as no one will argue that the state should be able 
to force the church to ordain women. Unfortunately, the Catholic women’s 
ordination case drew considerable attention at the Hosanna-Tabor oral argument, 
and in the opinion when the Court stated that it, the EEOC, and Perich all agreed 
“that it would violate the First Amendment for courts to apply such laws to compel 
the ordination of women by the Catholic Church or by an Orthodox Jewish 
seminary.”98 
The ordination example suggests that an employer’s religious reason (we do not 
ordain women) should always defeat an employee’s lawsuit. That has not been the 
case. Several Baptist churches held a religious, scripture-based belief that men are 
the heads of households and therefore entitled to higher pay than women.99 A 
Seventh-day Adventist church argued that it was entitled to demote and then fire an 
employee who filed an equal pay complaint because church doctrine prohibited 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). 
 96. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law & Religion Professors in Support of Respondents at 
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667 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). 
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lawsuits by its members.100 The Shiloh True Light Church of Christ challenged the 
minimum age requirements of the child labor laws, arguing that their religion 
required them to give their children vocational training.101 A Quaker charitable 
organization thought that its religious tradition of hospitality to the stranger should 
allow it to ignore the alien worker requirements of the immigration laws.102 
In all those cases courts rejected the religious defense and held the employers to 
the application of the employment laws.103 They based their decisions upon some 
variant of a balancing test. The cases decided in the pre-Employment Division v. 
Smith era applied strict scrutiny and balanced the burden upon religion against the 
government’s compelling interest. In the pre-Smith era, the burden on religion was 
viewed as insubstantial in the equal pay cases, and the government’s interest was 
seen as compelling in the child labor and immigration contexts.104 
The application of the ministerial exception in those cases involved the courts in 
deciding when and which religions either must obey or may disobey the laws. The 
result was unequal among religions. Presumably, the Baptists were as committed to 
their head-of-household rule as Catholics are to their all-male priesthood. 
Moreover, the government’s interest in both cases—women’s equality—was the 
same. 
The language of Hosanna-Tabor suggests that the Court has permanently struck 
the balance in favor of institutional religious freedom instead of the 
antidiscrimination laws. As the Court explained in Hosanna-Tabor: 
 The interest of society in the enforcement of employment 
discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the 
interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, 
teach their faith, and carry out their mission. When a minister who has 
been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was 
discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The 
church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.105 
Surely this preference for religion over antidiscrimination cannot and will not be 
absolute. As Methodist Minister Ralph Minker warned years ago, “taken to its 
logical conclusion [the ministerial exception] view would create a first amendment 
prohibition against even the most egregious human rights violations. . . . [F]or 
example, . . . under our formulation courts would be prevented from enforcing 
homicide statutes against churches that selected their pastors by making them play 
russian roulette.”106 
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I am confident the courts will prohibit religious employers from hiring and 
firing their ministers through Russian roulette. But by what reasoning? The courts 
will have to make a determination that some religious beliefs are worse than others, 
thereby undermining the neutrality among religions that the First Amendment 
should protect. 
As noted above, the more astonishing part of Hosanna-Tabor is its blithe 
assertion that religious employers win even when there is no religious dispute at 
stake: “The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire 
a minister only when it is made for a religious reason.”107 Instead of ruling that 
religious employers are justified in disobeying the law whenever they have a 
doctrinal reason to do so, the Court opened the possibility that purely secular 
lawsuits against religious employers will also be dismissed. 
In making this assertion, the Court appears to undermine court decisions that 
have permitted ministerial lawsuits for sexual harassment and hostile work 
environment. Both John Bollard and Christopher McKelvey alleged that as Roman 
Catholic seminarians they were sexually harassed by superiors who propositioned 
them, invited them to gay bars, showed them pornography, or engaged in other 
harassing conduct.108 Both men left the seminary because of the harassment. The 
Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court of New Jersey refused to apply the ministerial 
exception to those cases based in large part on the impossibility of interference in 
the churches’ choice of ministers because the seminarians did not want to return to 
the priesthood.109 
It was also relevant to, but not determinative of, the outcome of those two cases 
that neither church defendant espoused a religious belief in sexual harassment. That 
is true of all the sexual harassment cases; no church defends sexual harassment as a 
doctrinal matter. On that basis, several courts allowed sexual harassment lawsuits 
to proceed on the grounds that “[hostile work environment] ha[d] [any]thing to do 
with the . . . doctrine of the [Roman] Catholic Church,”110 sexual harassment is 
“unrelated to pastoral qualifications,”111 or the “reasons for termination are not 
religious-based.”112 In the Second Circuit, but not elsewhere,113 a “plaintiff alleging 
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particular wrongs by the church that are wholly non-religious in character is surely 
not forbidden his day in court.”114 District courts applied that rule to allow hostile 
work environment cases.115 
The Supreme Court now suggests those purely secular law disputes are covered 
by the ministerial exception, giving religious employers the right to free themselves 
from secular disputes even when secular employers may not. 
In other words, religious freedom means allowing religious institutions to 
violate the law even when nothing religious is at stake. Such a conclusion is at odds 
with any rational interpretation of the First Amendment. 
B. Religious Pretext 
The Sixth Circuit expressed doubt as to whether Hosanna-Tabor fired Perich for 
religious or nonreligious reasons. The school “attempted to reframe the underlying 
dispute from the question of whether Hosanna-Tabor fired Perich in violation of the 
ADA to the question of whether Perich violated church doctrine by not engaging in 
internal dispute resolution.”116 In employment law terms, Perich argued that the 
religious reason for her firing was pretextual and should not be believed by the trial 
court. 
Justice Alito’s questions at oral argument and concurrence expressed strong 
doubts about letting juries review evidence that a church firing was pretextual. The 
pretextual analysis, he argued, always intrudes upon religious doctrine: 
The credibility of Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted reason for terminating 
respondent’s employment could not be assessed without taking into 
account both the importance that the Lutheran Church attaches to the 
doctrine of internal dispute resolution and the degree to which that tenet 
compromised respondent’s religious function. If it could be shown that 
this belief is an obscure and minor part of Lutheran doctrine, it would 
be much more plausible for respondent to argue that this doctrine was 
not the real reason for her firing. If, on the other hand, the doctrine is a 
central and universally known tenet of Lutheranism, then the church’s 
asserted reason for her discharge would seem much more likely to be 
nonpretextual. But whatever the truth of the matter might be, the mere 
adjudication of such questions would pose grave problems for religious 
autonomy: It would require calling witnesses to testify about the 
importance and priority of the religious doctrine in question, with a 
civil factfinder sitting in ultimate judgment of what the accused church 
really believes, and how important that belief is to the church’s overall 
mission.117 
                                                                                                                 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2010) (accord). 
 114. Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 208 (emphasis added). 
 115. E.g., Rojas, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 397–98. 
 116. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 781 
(6th Cir. 2010). 
 117. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 715 
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
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According to the court decisions that agree with Justice Alito and favor the 
ministerial exception, constitutional trouble begins somewhere around the time that 
the defendant identifies its nonretaliatory reason or the plaintiff tries to prove 
pretext. The courts have repeatedly expressed First Amendment concerns about the 
entanglement with or intrusion upon religious doctrine that occurs if they dare 
attempt to decipher the churches’ motives in their employment decisions. They fear 
that allowing employment discrimination lawsuits to proceed will involve them in 
religious questions over which the First Amendment denies them authority. 
Those arguments reflect a misinterpretation of both employment and First 
Amendment law. As Judge Richard Posner has explained: 
[T]he question in a discrimination case is not whether the employer’s 
stated nondiscriminatory ground for the action of which the plaintiff is 
complaining is correct but whether it is the true ground of the 
employer’s action rather than being a pretext for a decision based on 
some other, undisclosed ground. If it is the true ground and not a 
pretext, the case is over.118 
In other words, “the question is not whether the asserted reason is true but whether 
the defendant believed it to be true when it took the challenged action.”119 
A similar distinction between what is true and what the defendant believed to be 
true is also a crucial component of First Amendment analysis. Under a long line of 
Supreme Court cases beginning with United States v. Ballard,120 courts and juries 
are free to decide whether an individual’s religious beliefs are sincerely held but 
not whether they are true.121 Soldiers are routinely subjected to court analysis of 
whether their religious beliefs are sincerely held before they receive conscientious 
objector status.122 Unemployment compensation benefits may be withheld or 
granted based on whether an applicant’s religion is sincerely held.123 Prisoners’ 
religious beliefs are regularly subjected to sincerity review when they request 
accommodation for their religious practices.124 Plaintiffs must hold a sincere 
religious belief in order to win a religious discrimination lawsuit under Title VII.125 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 417 (7th Cir. 2006) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted).  
 119. SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 27, at 126 (emphasis added). 
 120. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
 121. See supra note 120 and accompanying text; infra notes 122–27 and accompanying 
text. 
 122. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). 
 123. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989); Thomas v. Review 
Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981); Hansard v. Johns-Manville Prods. 
Corp., No. 1902, 1973 WL 129, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 1973) (dismissing plaintiff’s 
employment discrimination claim not to work Sundays on sincerity grounds because he had 
previously worked regularly on Sundays). 
 124. See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345 (1987). 
 125. See, e.g., Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 2009) (“To establish a 
prima facie case of religious discrimination, the employee must show: (1) she holds a sincere 
religious belief that conflicts with a job requirement; (2) she informed her employer of the 
conflict; and (3) she was disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting requirement.” 
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Legislators are usually subjected to a court determination of whether they acted 
with a secular purpose; the Establishment Clause invalidates their legislation if they 
acted with a religious purpose or a sham secular purpose.126 Finally, in the 
employment discrimination context, the Supreme Court has stated that the EEOC 
does not violate the First Amendment rights of a religious employer when it tries to 
“ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason for the 
discharge.”127 
Thus courts are wrong to hold, for example, that Holley Van Osdol’s lawsuit 
alleging demotion for reporting sexual abuse “inevitably leads the court into 
analysis of UCRS’ choice of a minister, even for purposes of a pretextual inquiry. 
The decision to hire or discharge a minister is itself inextricable from religious 
doctrine.”128 Judge Posner himself has defended a strong ministerial exception on 
similar grounds, arguing that in a pretext setting the “court would be asked to 
resolve a theological dispute.”129 That point ignores not only the courts’ regular 
examination of religious motivation but also their authorized use of “neutral 
principles of law” to resolve church property disputes. According to Jones v. Wolf, 
a court may review church deeds, charters, constitutional provisions, and other 
documents as long as it interprets them in purely secular terms.130 
The same rule should apply in the employment setting. Under McDonnell 
Douglas, a plaintiff “must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by 
competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in 
fact a coverup for a . . . discriminatory decision.”131 As in nonreligious cases, a 
“variety of evidence may help determine” pretext, including prefiring statements 
showing bias, violation of standard operating procedures, comparative treatment of 
other employees, data suggesting a general pattern of discrimination, and “non-
discriminatory justification stated only after the allegation of discrimination is 
made.”132 
Like Cheryl Perich, Todd David Barton complained that the religious reason for 
his firing was offered late in the litigation and was “rhetorical posturing” covering 
up the real reason for his dismissal—namely that the bishop retaliated against him 
for reporting that Pastor Mikel Hayes called Barton “hot” and “purred and pawed” 
                                                                                                                 
(citation removed)). 
 126. See McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005) (“Ever since 
Lemon v. Kurtzman summarized the three familiar considerations for evaluating 
Establishment Clause claims, looking to whether government action has ‘a secular legislative 
purpose’ has been a common, albeit seldom dispositive, element of our cases. Though we 
have found government action motivated by an illegitimate purpose only four times since 
Lemon, and ‘the secular purpose requirement alone may rarely be determinative . . . , it 
nevertheless serves an important function.’” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)). 
 127. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 628 
(1986). 
 128. Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1128–29 (Colo. 1996). 
 129. Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 130. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979). 
 131. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973). 
 132. Redhead v. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 566 F. Supp. 2d 125, 134 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 349 (E.D.N.Y 
1998)). 
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at him.133 Courts are capable of distinguishing between religious rhetoric and 
sincerely held religious belief. The argument about pretext and religious 
entanglement cannot justify the ministerial exception. 
The same pretext analysis should apply to civil rights statutes that prohibit 
discrimination based on race, gender, and age. 
Shorthand for the central issue in many racial discrimination ministerial 
exception cases is whether it was race or religion that motivated the adverse 
employment action. As suggested above, a court should be able to decide that 
question by examining religious motivation and by using neutral principles of law. 
For example, Dennis Ross was hired as Pastor of Worship Services at the 
Metropolitan Church of God in Cumming, Georgia in December 2003, where he 
conducted music and created videos and CDs. Soon after Ross started his job, 
however, Pastor Charles Ramsey complained about Ross’s music, telling him “‘this 
is a white church, Shirley Caesar music won’t work here,’ and ‘since you’ve come, 
the church is experiencing white flight.’”134 Ramsey also told Ross “‘Latinos are 
lazy,’ and ‘more blacks will probably join the church now that you are here, I guess 
we’ll get more “rims.”’”135 Ramsey then fired Ross in February 2004. 
Even if Ramsey’s remarks did not provide direct evidence of discrimination, a 
jury could determine whether they reflected racial discrimination or harmless “stray 
remarks” without ever debating the liturgical theology of the Metropolitan Church 
of God. 136 
Father Peter Bogan alleged that the Mississippi Conference of the United 
Methodist Church put him on administrative leave for not spending at least five 
nights a week at the parsonage, while Caucasian pastors who were similarly absent 
faced no discipline.137 His case could be decided like nonreligious racial 
discrimination cases in which the court considers whether race was a motivating 
factor in the adverse employment action, whether employees of different races were 
treated differently, and whether the church was credible in saying it really 
disciplined Bogan because he was not a good priest. 
The Seventh Circuit dismissed Reverend Darreyl Young’s race and gender 
discrimination case because she was a minister at the Northern Illinois Conference 
of the United Methodist Church.138 Her complaint was carefully drafted. She did 
not ask the court to consider the church’s reasons for dismissing her or to review 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. Barton v. MikelHayes, No. 09-CV-00063, 2010 WL 980708, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 15, 2010). 
 134. Ross v. Metro. Church of God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
 135. Id. 
 136. In the absence of evidence of intentional discrimination, a plaintiff may establish a 
prima facie racial discrimination claim under both § 1981 and Title VII by alleging facts 
establishing “(1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) 
adverse employment action with respect to compensation; and (4) that similarly-situated 
employees outside the protected class received more favorable treatment.” White v. BFI 
Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 137. Bogan v. Miss. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 433 F. Supp. 2d 762, 
763 (S.D. Miss. 2006). 
 138. Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 818 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. 
Ill. 1993), aff’d, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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her qualifications to become a church elder. Instead, she argued that the church had 
not followed the usual procedures it applied to all other candidates, and in 
particular, that the review panel that considered her application had a different 
composition from all previous committees.139 Moreover, the pastors told Young 
that they failed to promote her because they disliked her sermons even though they 
had never heard her preach. A neutral principles of law approach would have 
allowed the court to review meeting procedures and minutes without interfering in 
any question of dogma and to decide whether it was religion or discrimination that 
motivated the employment decision.140 
The late Judge Edward Becker understood this point when he wrote the initial 
Third Circuit opinion in Petruska v. Gannon University141 that was later withdrawn 
due to his untimely death. Lynette Petruska was hired as a chaplain by Gannon 
University, a Roman Catholic university. Accepting that only men may become 
Catholic priests, Petruska asked for and received assurances that her chaplain’s job 
was open to women and that she would not be replaced simply because a male 
priest candidate later became available. Later, her job responsibilities were 
restructured after she reported the university president’s sexual harassment to the 
local bishop and the university provost. A man was then promoted to her former 
position.142 Judge Becker rejected the application of the ministerial exception to 
Petruska’s case because the university offered no religious reason for firing her—
the position remained open to women. “[W]here an employment decision is devoid 
of religious or doctrinal content, and is based solely on sexism,” he wrote, “we fail 
to see how the decision relates to the free exercise of religion.”143 If sexism is the 
motivating factor, the laws prohibiting sex discrimination are violated. 
The same rule should apply in the age discrimination cases. Some courts have 
been optimistic about the possibilities of deciding age cases without violating the 
First Amendment, especially because age discrimination is not a religious tenet 
defended by any church defendants.144  Nonetheless, cases with direct evidence of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 139. Id. at 1207–08. 
 140. Id. 
 141. 448 F.3d 615 (3d Cir. 2006), vacated on reh’g, 461 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006), and 
withdrawn. For the old unpublished opinion with full text, see Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 
No. 05-1222 (3d Cir. May 24, 2006), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinl 
arch/051222p.pdf. 
 142. Petruska, No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at **5–8 (3d Cir. May 24, 
2006). 
 143. Id. at **47. 
 144. See, e.g., DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993) (allowing 
age discrimination case to proceed); Geary v. Visitation of Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 
7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); Ritter v. Mount St. Mary’s Coll., 814 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 
1987) (same); Miller v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, No. 09-CV-680-SLC, 2010 
WL 2803123 (W.D. Wis. July 14, 2010) (same); Hendricks v. Marist Catholic High Sch., 
No. CIV. 09-6336-AA, 2010 WL 1499251 (D. Or. Apr. 12, 2010) (same); Butler v. 
Archdiocese of Galveston Houston, No. CIV.A. H-08-897, 2009 WL 3837003 (S.D. Tex. 
Nov. 12, 2009) (same); Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F. Supp. 
2d 849 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (same); Grotke v. Canisius High Sch., No. 90-CV-1057S, 1992 WL 
535400 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1992) (same); Lukaszewski v. Nazareth Hosp., 764 F. Supp. 57 
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age discrimination have been dismissed under the ministerial exception. For 
example, his bishop told Rev. Ralph Minker that “‘he should not expect a new 
better level appointment and that Methodist pastors in their fifties cannot expect 
growth opportunities in new appointments.’”145 In another age discrimination case, 
“Father Serrick personally told [Organist George Assemany] that he was too old for 
the job and that Gesu was becoming a black parish and it was time it had a black 
organist.”146 After making those remarks, Serrick then hired Carl Clendenning, a 
twenty-eight-year-old black male, for Assemany’s position.147 Methodist Rev. John 
Paul Hankins was subjected to the United Methodists’ mandatory retirement policy 
requiring him to retire at age seventy.148 The Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA) allows some mandatory retirement policies, but whether the church 
qualified for that defense was not litigated in Hankins; the case was dismissed 
under the ministerial exception.149 
As in any employment lawsuit, a church could win an ADEA case, especially 
because the defendant is not liable “where the differentiation is based on reasonable 
factors other than age.”150 Thus the Maryknoll Society had good reason to win its 
case against Father Henry Willen Sanchez, a sixty-eight-year-old Roman Catholic 
priest who worked for Maryknoll from 1963 to 1967, but was rejected when he 
sought reemployment in 1996. Maryknoll had a policy not to reemploy individuals 
who had a lengthy separation from their service.151 That argument was never 
considered by the court, however, which dismissed the lawsuit under the ministerial 
exception. The McDonnell Douglas framework is now in question in ADEA cases, 
which instead require plaintiffs to prove that age was the “but-for” cause of the 
challenged adverse employment action.152 Like burden shifting, but-for causation 
does not automatically involve a theological question. 
                                                                                                                 
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (same); Soriano v. Xavier Univ. Corp., 687 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D. Ohio 1988) 
(same). 
 145. Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 
1355 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). 
 146. Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 434 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Hankins v. N.Y. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 351 F. App’x 
489, 409–91 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 149. See Id. at 489; see also 29 U.S.C. § 631(c) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12 (2005) 
(explaining that the ADEA allows employers to mandate the retirement of their employees 
because of their age, provided those employees meet three criteria: (1) the employee is sixty-
five or older, (2) the employee is entitled to collect a retirement benefit of at least $44,000 
annually, and (3) the employee was employed in a “bona fide executive” or “high 
policymaking” position for the two years immediately prior to retirement). 
 150. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006). 
 151. Sanchez v. Catholic Foreign Soc’y of Am., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 
1999). 
 152. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009) (“The burden of 
persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action 
regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one 
motivating factor in that decision.”); Clark v. Matthews Int’l Corp., 628 F.3d 462, 469 (8th 
Cir. 2010) (“[The plaintiff] is required to prove that his age was the ‘but-for’ cause of [the 
employer’s] challenged decisions regardless of whether he uses direct or circumstantial 
evidence to prove his age-discrimination claims.”). 
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The reasoning in favor of the ministerial exception even when a religious 
justification is not offered for the employer’s conduct is explained in a Seventh 
Circuit age discrimination opinion written by Judge Posner.153 Richard Tomic 
worked as a music director and organist at St. Mary’s Cathedral in Peoria and for 
the Roman Catholic Peoria Diocese. Tomic, who was fifty and was not an ordained 
Catholic priest, alleged that the diocese fired him because of his age and replaced 
him with a younger man.154 As in most of the ministerial exception cases, the facts 
are tantalizingly brief.155 Tomic’s complaint suggests that problems arose when 
Tomic disagreed with a priest about the scheduling of choir practices during Easter 
week: Tomic “had expressed his concerns to Rev. Gray that the scheduling he 
(Gray) was requesting would have a detrimental effect on the music scheduled for 
Easter week.”156 After the firing, moreover, the church contested Tomic’s 
application for unemployment compensation; “the Diocese first took the position 
that plaintiff left his job voluntarily and later took the position that he was 
terminated for misconduct.”157 
Surely that case should get to court, because the church did not have a religious 
tenet of age discrimination, the nature of the dispute was not theological, and the 
diocese’s changing story suggests pretext and undermines credibility, correct? No, 
explained Judge Posner: 
[T]his is not correct, because the church would be likely to defend its 
employment action on grounds related to church needs rooted in church 
doctrine. The reference in the complaint in this case to the dispute 
between Tomic and the bishop’s assistant suggests that if the suit were 
permitted to go forward, the diocese would argue that he was dismissed 
for a religious reason—his opinion concerning the suitability of 
particular music for Easter services—and the argument could propel the 
court into a controversy, quintessentially religious, over what is suitable 
music for Easter services. Tomic would argue that the church’s 
criticism of his musical choices was a pretext for firing him, that the 
real reason was his age. The church would rebut with evidence of what 
the liturgically proper music is for an Easter Mass and Tomic might in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. See Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 154. Id. at 1037. 
 155. Id. Age discrimination cases without facts are also prevalent. See, e.g., Skrzypczak 
v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010); Clapper v. Chesapeake 
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 97-2648, 1998 WL 904528 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 
1998); Hopkins v. DeVeaux, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (N.D. Ga. 2011); Musante v. Notre Dame 
of Easton Church, No. Civ. A. 301CV2352MRK, 2004 WL 721774 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 
2004);; Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994); Temple Emanuel of Newton 
v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, No. Civ. A. 09-1950, 2009 WL 1668550 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. June 2, 2009); Coulee Catholic Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 2009 WI 
88, 320 Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868. 
 156. Brief and Required Short Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant, Richard Tomic at 4, 
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006), 2005 WL 5806789. 
 157. Id. at 4–5. 
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turn dispute the church’s claim. The court would be asked to resolve a 
theological dispute.158 
The contrast between the opinion and the facts of the case undermines the 
Seventh Circuit’s rationale. The court first imagined its own theological dispute 
over music while the parties were arguing about scheduling, possibly turning a 
secular dispute into a doctrinal one. Second—like all the courts that have adopted 
the ministerial exception—the court engaged in actual theological analysis before 
ruling it could not resolve a questionably theological issue. After all, the court 
made a doctrinal ruling that Tomic was a minister, even though he was not a priest. 
Music, it ruled, is central to liturgy and therefore a musician must be a minister. 
Now the Supreme Court appears to have adopted even stronger reasoning than 
the Seventh Circuit’s: that the courts cannot get away from religion even in a 
secular dispute. Again, the Court has provided no rationale for siding with religious 
employers over religious employees in such circumstances. The only reason it 
seems to provide is that ministers are different. The next Part reviews the question 
of who now qualifies as a minister for ministerial exception purposes. 
V. WHO IS A MINISTER? 
Obviously (and not) the ministerial exception applies to ministers. Hosanna-
Tabor clarified that the ministerial exception is a defense on the merits rather than a 
jurisdictional bar.159 The exception is an affirmative defense because the issue is 
“whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief,” not whether the 
court has “power to hear [the] case.”160 Therefore district courts have the power to 
decide whether employment claims can proceed or are barred by the affirmative 
defense of the ministerial exception. Presumably, the primary question to be 
determined by the trial courts is whether the employee is a minister or not. The 
following sections argue that the test for a minister remains problematic and 
excessively deferential to religious institutions. Part V.A explains that the question 
of ministerial status is always a theological question unsuited for determination by 
the courts. Part V.B examines the ambiguity of the Court’s suggestion that some 
breach of contract lawsuits may proceed despite the ministerial exception. Part V.C 
explores whether the courts may continue to hear tort disputes involving ministers. 
A. Ministry Is Always a Theological Question 
As argued in Part II, Hosanna-Tabor avoids the question why ministers should 
be denied the protection of the employment laws. Moreover, there is no neutral and 
secular legal manner to resolve the question of who qualifies as a minister. On the 
grounds that they may not become entangled in a religious employer’s decision 
making, the courts regularly became entwined in a more theological question by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1040 (citations omitted). 
 159. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 
n.4 (2012). 
 160. Id. (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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deciding who should count as a minister. As Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski 
wrote, “[t]he very invocation of the ministerial exemption requires us to engage in 
entanglement [with religion] with a vengeance.”161 
The ministerial exception has never been limited to clergy or ordained ministers. 
The courts have turned theological cartwheels to transform elementary and 
secondary school teachers, university and seminary professors, school principals, 
communications managers, administrative personnel, music directors, organists, 
and musicians into ministers.162 The effect has been especially strong on teachers—
elementary and high school teachers, school principals, college and university 
instructors and professors—who the courts have turned into ministers, denying 
them the protection of the disability, age, gender, pregnancy, race, sexual 
harassment, and breach of contract laws.163 Several courts relied upon the 
ministerial exception to dismiss lawsuits of university professors without review of 
their academic qualifications or employment records.164 
One irony and injustice in the ministerial rule is that female employees of 
denominations that do not ordain women suddenly became ministers at the moment 
they filed a lawsuit. Although some Roman Catholic, Muslim, and Orthodox 
                                                                                                                 
 
 161. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, 
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 164. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (dismissing 
canon law professor’s Title VII sex discrimination case); Klouda v. Sw. Baptist Theological 
Seminary, 543 F. Supp. 2d 594 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (dismissing seminary professor’s breach of 
contract case); Hope Int’l Univ. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 4th 719 (2004) (dismissing 
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discrimination); McEnroy v. St. Meinrad Sch. of Theology, 713 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 
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Theological Seminary, 608 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1992) (dismissing theology professor’s breach of 
contract claim); Jocz v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 538 N.W.2d 588 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1995) (dismissing seminary director of field education’s sex discrimination lawsuit). 
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Jewish women may not become priests, imams, or rabbis and perform their jobs 
with the full understanding that they cannot be ministers, the courts and churches 
confer ministerial status upon them just long enough to keep their lawsuits out of 
court.165 This situation is the clearest proof that the ministerial exception unfairly 
overprotects the rights of institutions at the expense of individuals. 
The injustices continue post-Hosanna-Tabor. A Kentucky court ruled that a 
tenured Jewish scholar of Jewish Studies at a Disciples of Christ seminary was a 
minister whose breach of contract lawsuit must be dismissed.166 The dissenting 
justice wisely complained, “A basic tenet of Christianity is that Jesus Christ is the 
Son of God. Judaism does not accept that tenet. Therefore, it appears that, because 
of this seminal difference, Kant, as a practicing Jew, would not be qualified to be a 
minister of any Christian faith.”167 In the courts, however, Catholic women become 
priests and Jewish scholars turn out to be Christian ministers. 
Although all the circuit courts agreed before Hosanna-Tabor was decided that 
the Religion Clauses require a ministerial exception, they disagreed about who 
qualifies as a minister. The Sixth Circuit relied upon a “primary duties” test to 
determine that Perich was not a minister. As the name suggests, that test often 
counted the minutes in the employee’s day to determine if her activity was 
primarily secular or religious. If Perich or another teacher taught reading, writing, 
and arithmetic all day with only a little time for religion, she could be labeled a 
teacher instead of a minister and have her day in court. Chief Justice Roberts 
rejected such an approach when he wrote that ministerial status “is not one that can 
be resolved by a stopwatch.”168 
In Hosanna-Tabor’s argument before the Court, Professor Douglas Laycock 
argued for an important religious functions test, where the question is whether the 
employee performed any important religious functions.169 Because of the concerns 
about religious entanglement, Laycock urged judicial deference toward the 
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 166. See Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, No. 2011-CA-000004-MR, 2012 WL 
3046472 (Ky. Ct. App. July 27, 2012). 
 167. Id. at *15 (Keller, J., dissenting). 
 168. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 
(2012). 
 169. Brief for the Petitioner at 22, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. 
v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553). 
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churches’ definition of who counts as a minister. Justice Thomas agreed; his 
concurrence concluded that courts should “defer to a religious organization’s good-
faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister.”170 Justice Thomas’s approach 
gives religious organizations broad freedom to violate the law; all they have to do 
is invoke ministerial status in order to win their lawsuits. 
The other eight Justices provided minimal guidance for future cases. The Court 
rejected the EEOC’s idea that a minister performs “exclusively religious 
functions,”171 perhaps influenced by the Chief Justice’s clever quip that although 
the Pope performs numerous secular duties in Vatican City, he is undoubtedly a 
minister.172 In resolving the ministerial question, the Court instead emphasized the 
facts that Hosanna-Tabor considered Perich to be a minister, and that Perich 
accepted the formal call to religious service and claimed a minister’s housing 
allowance on her tax return. Ministerial status was thus based on “the formal title 
given Perich by the Church, the substance reflected in that title, her own use of that 
title, and the important religious functions she performed for the Church.”173 Any 
employee “conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission” is 
presumed to be a minister. 174 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, wrote that the word minister, 
should apply to any “employee” who leads a religious organization, 
conducts worship services or important religious ceremonies or rituals, 
or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith. . . . These include those 
who serve in positions of leadership, those who perform important 
functions in worship services and in the performance of religious 
ceremonies and rituals, and those who are entrusted with teaching and 
conveying the tenets of the faith to the next generation.175 
All the Justices were concerned that “minister” be interpreted broadly enough to 
include non-Christian clergy of whatever title as well as denominations that lack 
official clergy. 
Following those definitions, it is possible that some past ministerial exception 
cases were wrongly dismissed and that some limited future victories await plaintiffs 
in similar circumstances. On the other hand, the Court’s new test may cover some 
employees, especially teachers, who were previously allowed to sue. 
Presumably, a non-Catholic teacher in a Catholic school is still not a minister.176 
What about a lay math teacher at a parochial high school who also led students in 
prayer and took students to mass? In the Second Circuit he was not a minister; 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 171. Id. at 708–09. 
 172. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553). 
 173. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708. 
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 175. Id. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 176. See, e.g., Braun v. St. Pius X Parish, No. 09–CV–779–GKF–TLW, 2011 WL 
5086362 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 25, 2011). But see Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, No. 
2011-CA-000004-MR, 2012 WL 3046472 (Ky. Ct. App. July 27, 2012) (Jewish Studies 
professor is a Christian minister for purposes of the ministerial exception). 
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would the Supreme Court ordain him?177 Could a teacher who taught “exclusively 
secular subjects” now become a minister if his employers believe that all teachers 
“carry[] out its mission”?178 Will the Court describe religious studies as an 
academic discipline, or does anyone teaching “religion” become a minister?179 In 
the past, church schools that believed that all employees were ministers were 
required to pay equal wages to women even when it violated biblical teaching.180 
Does the Court’s careful acknowledgment of churches in which everyone is a 
minister mean that those precedents are no longer good law? 
Especially interesting are cases such as that of Alicia Hernandez, a press 
secretary for a Catholic diocese. A “press secretary is responsible for conveying the 
message of an organization to the public as a whole[,] . . . is often the primary 
communications link to the general populace[,] . . . [and] is critical in message 
dissemination.”181 Are all press secretaries now ministers because they “convey[] 
the Church’s message”?182 
With Hosanna-Tabor limited to its facts, the trial courts will still struggle with 
an eminently theological question of church ministry. If the ministerial definition is 
unclear, they will undoubtedly do what they have done in the past: avoid any 
possible entanglement with religion. The best way to avoid entanglement is to 
dismiss a case. The ministerial rule always favors employers. 
B. The Breach of Contract Exception 
The Supreme Court left an opening for some lawsuits by religious employees 
when it stated “[w]e express no view on whether the exception bars other types of 
suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious 
conduct by their religious employers.”183 
Long before Hosanna-Tabor was decided, some appeals courts distinguished 
breach of contract cases from antidiscrimination lawsuits. Three stated reasons for 
the difference were that churches may voluntarily burden themselves with 
contracts,184 contracts are not matters of theological doctrine, and awarding purely 
monetary damages on a contract claim does not entangle the courts with religion. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 177.  See DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993).  
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Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church,185 the 
D.C. Circuit’s leading ministerial exception case, illustrates this point. The court 
rejected Methodist Minister Ralph Minker’s age-discrimination lawsuit under the 
ministerial exception. It also dismissed his breach of contract claim that the church 
had violated the Methodist Book of Discipline, which states “appointments are to 
be made without regard to race, ethnic origin, sex, color, or age, except for the 
provisions of mandatory retirement.”186 The court dismissed that contract claim 
because it “could not interpret or enforce such a provision without running afoul of 
the first amendment” by construing the theological book.187 
Nonetheless, the court remanded Minker’s breach of contract claim based on the 
church’s oral promise that Minker “would be moved to a congregation more suited 
to his training and skills, and more appropriate in level of income, at the earliest 
appropriate time.”188 In those secular circumstances, the court thought that “the 
issue of breach of contract can be adduced by a fairly direct inquiry into whether 
appellant’s superintendent promised him a more suitable congregation, whether 
appellant gave consideration in exchange for that promise, and whether such 
congregations became available but were not offered to Pastor Minker.”189 
The court also recognized that breach of contract litigation would result in 
“[m]oney damages alone.”190 The limitation to money damages is important. 
Successful employment-discrimination plaintiffs are entitled to remedies that make 
them whole, including back pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, front 
pay, and reinstatement to the job.191 Proponents of a strong ministerial exception 
believe that the First Amendment prohibits any award of damages against religious 
employers and accordingly urge the dismissal of all religious employment 
lawsuits.192 Among all the potential remedies, however, the idea of reinstatement of 
an employee to a ministerial position has been particularly troubling to the courts 
and church defendants. Indeed, Hosanna-Tabor identified reinstatement as 
“[p]erhaps the most fundamental problem with discrimination suits by ministers[,]” 
likening reinstatement to the government’s appointment of ministers in an 
established church.193 
Cheryl Perich’s lawyers took that argument seriously and emphasized that she 
was not seeking reinstatement but still deserved other damages such as back pay 
and front pay.194 Despite Perich’s loss, the Court may be sympathetic to a breach of 
contract claim without the possibility of reinstatement that is limited to monetary 
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loss. Monetary damages appear far from the governmental-appointment-of- 
ministers concern that persuaded the Justices to rule against Perich. 
Such reasoning explains and justifies the results of Bollard and McKelvey, the 
two seminarian cases where reinstatement was not a remedy but monetary damages 
were.195 In other religious breach of contract cases, ministers have been allowed to 
sue for payment of salary for services already rendered,196 for the difference 
between short-term disability benefits and salary,197 for a congregation’s failure to 
pay into a rabbi’s retirement fund,198 and for terminating the employee’s contract 
without a proper notice and meeting.199 Post Hosanna-Tabor, two courts have 
already ruled that actual ministers—pastors with the Presbyterian Church and the 
African Methodist Episcopal Church, respectively—may pursue breach of contract 
claims for wages due on past work already completed without even citing 
Hosanna-Tabor.200 
Yet Minker also created a loophole that has been applied to other breach of 
contract cases; it cautioned that even Minker’s contract case must be dismissed if 
the court became entangled in any theological controversy or ecclesiastical policy. 
Unfortunately, a quick trip to entanglement takes place when the employer asserts 
that the contract was not enforced because the employee was not qualified for the 
job or performed the job poorly. For example, Episcopal priest Janet Kraft tried to 
enforce an employment contract that entitled her to certain benefits if her 
termination occurred without cause. She contested the church’s allegation that she 
was fired for making improper expenditures on the church’s credit card.201 High-
school principal Patricia Dayner alleged that her firing by Father Bzdyra was 
“motivated by or in retaliation for [her] refusal to ‘stick up for him’ regarding his 
unwanted sexual remarks to eighth grade girls.”202 Both contract lawsuits were 
dismissed because the courts feared theological issues in the discussions of how 
Reverend Kraft had spent the money or why Father Bzdyra had dismissed Principal 
Dayner. 
Even some cases that appear more purely economic, for example, a church’s 
refusal to pay workers’ compensation for a priest-employee who was injured lifting 
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a television;203 an employee who was fired allegedly because his organization lost 
funding;204 a church’s provision of inadequate medical care to a missionary-
employee overseas;205 or a church’s failure to provide food, clothes, housing, and 
medical care to another overseas missionary,206 have all been dismissed under fear 
of entanglement. An exception for breach of contract will not solve the core 
problems of the ministerial exception rule. 
C. The Tortious Conduct Exception 
The Supreme Court also left an opening for some lawsuits by religious 
employees alleging tortious conduct by their religious employers.207 Torts have 
enjoyed a mixed reception in prior ministerial exception cases. In the Second 
Circuit, for example, the ministerial exception “plainly [did] not create for religious 
institutions a charmed existence free from liability for their torts and upon their 
valid contracts.”208 “[A] plaintiff alleging particular wrongs by the church that are 
wholly non-religious in character is surely not forbidden his day in court. The 
minister struck on the head by a falling gargoyle as he is about to enter the church 
may have an actionable claim.”209 
Torts may have attracted the Court’s attention because of general concerns about 
the extensive sexual abuse of children by clergy210 and a Michigan case that had a 
certiorari petition before the Court while Hosanna-Tabor was argued. Michigan 
elementary school teacher Madeline Weishuhn was fired by a Catholic school 
principal for reporting possible sexual abuse of a student’s friend to state 
authorities.211 Even though Weishuhn was a required reporter of abuse under state 
law, Michigan state courts dismissed her whistleblowers lawsuit under the 
ministerial exception.212 At oral argument, Justice Sotomayor asked Hosanna-
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Tabor’s lawyer, “How about a teacher who reports sexual abuse to the government 
and is fired because of that reporting?”213 
In response, Professor Laycock distinguished between the government’s interest 
in protecting ministers from discrimination and the government’s interest in 
protecting children from abuse: 
If the government’s interest is in protecting ministers from 
discrimination, we are squarely within the heart of the ministerial 
exception. If the government’s interest is something quite different 
from that, like protecting the children, then you can assess whether that 
government interest is sufficiently compelling to justify interfering with 
the relationship between the church and its ministers. But the 
government’s interest is at its nadir when the claim is: We want to 
protect these ministers as such. We want to tell the churches what 
criteria they should apply for—for selecting and removing ministers.214 
In other words, the government has some interest in protecting children from abuse 
but no interest in protecting ministers from discrimination. Weishuhn should lose 
her case. 
Laycock’s answer suggests that some third-party tort lawsuits do not violate the 
First Amendment. If a victim of sexual abuse sues a bishop for his negligent 
supervision of an abuser-priest, then presumably the government’s interest prevails 
and the fear of governmental intrusion upon ministerial decisions does not apply.215 
More usual are lawsuits like Weishuhn’s, where employee-whistleblowers 
allege that they faced retaliatory firing for their protected legal conduct. Catholic 
school principal Yolanda Miñagorri was fired after she complained to the 
Archdiocese of Miami that her supervisor, Father Jesus Saldana, assaulted and 
battered her.216 Organist William Moersen was fired after he reported his own sex 
abuse to church officials.217 Father John Conley was punished and defamed after 
reporting another priest’s sexual misconduct.218 Chapman University Chaplain 
Shaunie Schmoll had her work hours cut in half after she reported the sexual 
harassment of students by two faculty members.219 Margie Weiter was fired from 
her bookkeeper/receptionist job with the Archdiocese of Louisville after she 
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reported instances of clergy sexual abuse.220 Rabbi Steven Ballaban alleged that he 
was fired after he reported improper physical contact between a teacher and a 
student.221 Gannon University Chaplain Lynette Petruska’s job responsibilities 
were restructured after she reported the university president’s sexual harassment to 
the local bishop and the university provost.222 Vineyard Community Church 
workers Sandi Horine and Greg Williams were fired after they consulted with an 
attorney about the possibility that their church was violating employment laws 
against sex discrimination.223 Reverend Julius Baker was fired after he reported his 
suspicions that African Methodist Episcopal Church bishops had converted church 
funds for their own personal use and failed to pay federal income tax.224 Christian 
Methodist Episcopal Church Reverend Lee Otis Gellington helped his coworker 
Veronica Little, who suffered sexual advances from her supervisor, to draft a 
complaint to the bishop. Soon after he was asked to transfer to a church over 800 
miles away, where he would receive reduced pay.225 
Gellington is striking because of its similarities to a later Supreme Court case 
permitting Roderick Jackson, a male girls’ high school basketball coach who 
complained that his team did not receive equal funding, to assert a Title VII 
retaliation claim even though he was not the victim of sex discrimination.226 
Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions have insisted, “Title VII’s 
antiretaliation provision must be construed to cover a broad range of employer 
conduct.”227 Yet Gellington, like most of the other cases mentioned in this section, 
was dismissed under the ministerial exception.228 
Some courts have held religious employers accountable for libel and intentional 
interference with expectancy of employment.229 Others have dismissed defamation 
and tortious blacklisting claims.230 Perhaps courts will now construe the torts 
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exception expansively due to the dicta in Hosanna-Tabor. But there is no 
requirement to do so.231 As in the definition of minister and breach of contract 
areas, the fear of entanglement may shut these cases down. 
A better option would be to have the same tort, contract, and employment law 
for everyone. The Conclusion explains some avenues to that goal. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Hosanna-Tabor promises to be a decision limited to its facts, its 
reasoning presents a disturbing portrait of the First Amendment. Individual 
ministers fall outside the protection of the antidiscrimination laws.232 Individual 
religious believers are subject to the rule of Smith, while institutions are not.233 
Institutional religious freedom allows the firing of ministerial employees for any 
reasons, even nonreligious ones.234 The test of who qualifies as a minister is vague 
enough that courts will continue to engage in theological discussion to resolve that 
controversy.235 The rule always favors employers. A unanimous Court appeared 
dismissive of the idea that religious employees should have their day in court. The 
Court forgot that to exempt religious organizations from “neutral laws of general 
applicability”236 “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief 
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every [religious organization] 
to become a law unto himself.”237 
The Court had less drastic options than to accept a ministerial exception that 
puts religious organizations above and outside the law. As noted above, the favorite 
straw woman is that without the exception courts will force denominations with all-
male clergy to accept women priests. Using the ministerial exception to address 
that problem, however, is like swatting a fly with a sledgehammer. Title VII allows 
employers to use religion, sex, or national origin as a bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ) whenever “reasonably necessary to the normal operation of 
that particular business or enterprise.”238 Gender-based BFOQs are disfavored and 
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record that Rabbi Ballaban was dismissed for other reasons, the court need not answer the 
question whether the ministerial exception applies when a minister reports child abuse or 
neglect). But see id. at 32–33 (Vaidik, J., concurring) (“the ministerial exception does not 
allow a congregation to fire a spiritual leader who refuses to commit a criminal offense”; in 
Indiana, failure to report child abuse is a criminal offense). 
 232. See supra Part II. 
 233. See supra Part III. 
 234. See supra Part IV. 
 235. See supra Part V. 
 236. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 237. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)). 
 238. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e) (2006) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and 
employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any 
individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for 
employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-
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may be invoked “only when the essence of the business operation would be 
undermined” by hiring individuals of both sexes.239 
Gender-based BFOQs have been allowed in some circumstances, such as airport 
security screeners and prison guards. It is likely that religions would have at least as 
easy a time as a government employer in proving BFOQ in the context of ordaining 
women. The Roman Catholic Church, for example, argues that Scripture, the 
experience of Jesus and the Apostles, and its two-millennia-old tradition require an 
all-male priesthood. Moreover, theologically speaking only men can represent 
Jesus— 
when Christ’s role in the Eucharist is to be expressed sacramentally, 
there would not be this “natural resemblance” which must exist 
between Christ and his minister if the role of Christ were not taken by a 
man: in such a case it would be difficult to see in the minister the image 
of Christ. For Christ himself was and remains a man.240 
In these circumstances, the church could easily prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence “1) that the job qualification justifying the discrimination is reasonably 
necessary to the essence of its business; and 2) that [sex] is a legitimate proxy for 
the qualification because (a) it has a ‘substantial basis for believing that all or 
nearly all [women] lack the qualification.’”241 The BFOQ is a much more 
satisfactory, narrow defense to Susan Rockwell’s ordination lawsuit than the broad 
ministerial exception. 
The BFOQ solution would allow lawsuits against religious employers when they 
discriminate against the women they hire. As Judge Becker wrote, “where an 
employment decision is devoid of religious or doctrinal content, and is based solely 
on sexism, we fail to see how the decision relates to the free exercise of 
religion.”242 Thus the first ministerial exception case of Salvation Army minister 
Billie McClure, who sued because she wanted equal pay to her male coworkers, 
should have been litigated. An argument that religious organizations may 
discriminate against the women they hire is simply another way of stating that 
religious organizations do not have to obey the law. 
                                                                                                                 
management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to 
admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or 
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 239. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
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INSIGNIORES ON THE ADMISSION OF WOMEN TO THE MINISTERIAL PRIESTHOOD (1976), 
available at http://www.doctrinafidei.va/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19761015_inter-
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 241. EEOC v. Boeing Co., 843 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). 
 242. Petruska v. Gannon Univ., No. 05-1222, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 13135, at *47 (3d 
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Under existing law, religious race discrimination poses a harder question 
because Title VII prohibits employers from using race as a BFOQ.243 Medical 
employers, for example, may not hire white workers because their patients prefer 
them to blacks.244 What should happen if the Nation of Islam or the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints requires that its ministers be black or white?245 The only 
rationale left for the practice is that religions are free to disobey the law and may 
discriminate on the basis of race. 
Should the ministerial exception exist in order to allow churches to exclude 
employees on the basis of their race? As in the gender context, the case law does 
not involve blacks trying to become ministers in white churches or the reverse. 
Instead employees sue for racial discrimination in churches that do not advocate it. 
Those are the cases that the ministerial exception aborts. 
Consider the circumstances of Father Justinian Rweyemamu, a “black African 
ordained Catholic priest from Tanzania, East Africa,”246 whose race discrimination 
case established the ministerial exception in the Second Circuit.247 Indeed, a 
Connecticut court stated there could not be a “clearer case” of the need for judicial 
abstention than Father Justinian’s.248 Father Justinian alleged that despite his ten 
years experience as a diocesan priest and his five years of service at St. Bernard’s 
Church in Rockville, Connecticut, he was refused a promotion to administrator of 
the parish and a less-qualified white deacon was appointed in his place. He also 
claimed that he was harassed over his work for a nonprofit organization that 
supported economic development for poor children.249 Much later, after his initial 
lawsuits were dismissed under the ministerial exception, he was fired from his 
parish and sued for retaliation, defamation, tortious interference in business 
relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; those claims were also 
dismissed under the ministerial exception.250 
In the retaliation lawsuit, the church argued it had “just cause” to remove Father 
Justinian because there were “complaints regarding his homilies, complaints 
regarding his interaction with parish staff,” concern that his charitable work 
                                                                                                                 
 
 243. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e)(1) (mentioning religion, sex, and national origin but not 
race as allowed for BFOQ). 
 244. Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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 247. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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CV054003388S, 2005 WL 2981758, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 2005) (“This case 
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 249. Rweyemamu, 911 A.2d  at 323 . 
 250. Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 200–01. 
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“interfered with his full-time parochial duties” and left him “not sufficiently 
devoted to” his duties.251 Another reason given was “the necessity of giving a 
unified and positive witness to the people of the parish,”252 which may be another 
way of saying that good priests do not file lawsuits. 
Except for the last item, presumably that list also provided reasons why Father 
Justinian failed to get the promotion over the white deacon. Notice that the core of 
the defense was not the disputed theological content of the homilies, but the fact 
that parishioners had complained about them. The other criticisms were about the 
amount of time that Father Justinian put into his job. This is all evidence of whether 
it was race or religion that motivated the employment decision. A jury could have 
determined whether Father Justinian was fired for religious reasons or for racial 
discrimination. 
Post Hosanna-Tabor, Rweyemamu is an even clearer case of the ministerial 
exception for two reasons. First, no one doubts he is a minister because he is an 
ordained priest in a hierarchical church where priests have a different status from 
nonpriests. Second, the Court ruled that ministers may be fired for nonreligious 
reasons; Father Justinian may be fired for racially discriminatory reasons. 
That is what the ministerial exception amounts to, namely a First Amendment 
justification for disobeying the law even when it does not violate anyone’s 
conscience. 
As noted above, in ruling for Hosanna-Tabor, the Court explicitly rejected the 
EEOC’s argument that Perich’s case should be handled by the freedom of 
association protected by the First Amendment. One advantage of relying on 
association instead of religion is that “the right to freedom of association is a right 
enjoyed by religious and secular groups alike.”253 Another advantage is that, 
because freedom of association protects expressive association,254 it forces 
organizations to be clear about their membership rules and about what membership 
in their organizations represents and expresses.255 It would be better to force 
religious organizations to state openly their willingness to discriminate on the basis 
of race, gender, disabilities, sexual orientation, national origin, and age than to give 
them the free pass to disobey the laws for any reason that the Court awarded them 
in Hosanna-Tabor. 
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